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JUSTICE FOR THE FORGOTTEN: SAVING 
THE WOMEN OF DARFUR 
Rebecca A. Corcoran* 
Abstract: Since 2003, Darfur has lost nearly half of its six million inhabi-
tants. As many as 500,000 people have been slaughtered, 2.2 million have 
been displaced, and an untold number have been savagely raped—all vic-
tims of a brutal five-year genocide orchestrated by the Sudanese govern-
ment. The women of Darfur have borne the brunt of the violence: con-
stantly targeted for rape, left physically and emotionally broken. The use 
of rape as a weapon of war should have shocked the conscience of the 
world, but we have failed to act, and instead have allowed the women of 
Darfur to be victimized repeatedly. This note argues that the international 
community must take two steps to save the women of Darfur: (1) continue 
criminal prosecutions of those responsible for the genocide in the Inter-
national Criminal Court and (2) immediately undertake humanitarian so-
lutions in Darfur, including aid disbursement, reparations, military inter-
vention, and political pressure. It is only by combining legal and restor-
ative solutions that the forgotten women of Darfur will truly receive justice. 
Introduction 
Man’s inhumanity to man is not only perpetrated by the vitriolic actions of 
those who are bad. It is also perpetrated by the vitiating inaction of those 
who are good. 
—Martin Luther King, Jr.1 
 Halima Abdelkarim is twenty-one years old.2 She lives in Chad, 
just over the border from Darfur, Sudan, and is married with a baby 
daughter.3 She is also a member of the Dajo, a black African tribe, 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2007–2008). With 
thanks to my mom, for teaching me the importance of social justice and the rewards of 
hard work. 
1 Nicholas D. Kristof, Disposable Cameras for Disposable People, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2006, 
at D14 (quoting The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. 229 (Clayborne Car-
son ed., 1998). 
2 Nicholas D. Kristof, The Face of Genocide, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2006, at D13. Halima 
was twenty years old at the time of Kristof’s writing, which would make her at least twenty-
one years old now. See id. 
3 Id. 
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which makes her a target of the Janjaweed––the Arab militias who, 
bankrolled by the Sudanese government, are on a five-year genocidal 
quest to control the region by systematically exterminating the Afri-
cans who live on the land.4 In March 2006, the Janjaweed spilled over 
from Sudan to Chad and attacked Halima’s village, killing many of 
the men and kidnapping ten women and girls, among them Halima, 
who was four months pregnant at the time, and her ten-year-old sister, 
Sadia.5 Over the next two days, three men wearing Sudanese military 
uniforms gang raped Halima, beat her with sticks, and taunted her 
with racial epithets.6 The Janjaweed eventually released the women, 
but not before demanding Sadia’s donkey, and then shooting and kill-
ing Sadia when she refused to give it to them.7 After escaping, Halima 
and the other survivors settled in a makeshift camp some distance 
away from their village, which the Janjaweed had destroyed. 8  Al-
though they lived fearfully in deplorable conditions, Halima was able 
to deliver a healthy baby girl.9 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id.; see Amnesty Int’l, Sudan, Darfur, Rape as a Weapon of War 3 (2004), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR540762004ENGLISH/$File/AFR5407604.pdf; Justin 
Wagner, Note, The Systematic Use of Rape as a Tool of War in Darfur: A Blueprint for International War 
Crimes Prosecutions, 37 Geo. J. Int’l L. 193, 195 (2005). “Janjaweed” is an Arabic word meaning 
“a man (a devil) on a horse,” and was originally used to describe bandits who attack rural areas. 
Wagner, supra, at 198. The Janjaweed in today’s Darfur is a massive, loosely-united militia made 
up of nomadic Arabs. Id. The Janjaweed was formed by and is controlled by the Sudanese gov-
ernment, which uses the militia to attack the African tribes living in Darfur. Id.; see also Rosanna 
Lipscomb, Note, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A Search for a Per-
manent Solution in Sudan, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 182, 189–90 (2006) (stating that human rights 
groups, international news agencies, the United Nations (U.N.), and the U.S. State Department 
have gathered intelligence that clearly demonstrates that the Sudanese government is responsi-
ble for the atrocities committed by the Janjaweed). 
5 Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
6 Id. Unlike most conflicts in Arab nations, the Darfur conflict has nothing to do with 
religion, as the Janjaweed, the government, and the black African tribes are all Muslim. See 
Wagner, supra note 4, at 197. Rather, although the Arab tribes and the African tribes look 
very similar to outsiders, the conflict is at least partially based on race. See id. When carry-
ing out attacks, particularly rapes, the Janjaweed often vocalize their hatred of the black 
African tribes (the Fur, the Barni, the Tama, the Jebel, the Aranaga, and the Masaalit, 
among others), shouting that militias are allowed to rape and take land because the vic-
tims are black. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 193, 197, 204; see also Stephanie N. Sackellares, 
From Bosnia to Sudan: Sexual Violence in Modern Armed Conflict, 20 Wis. Women’s L.J. 137, 138 
(2005). 
7 Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
8 Id. 
9 See id. Although Halima managed to escape the Janjaweed, the attacks destroyed her 
family. Id. Because rape victims face an extraordinary stigma in Sudanese culture, often 
finding themselves ostracized by their husbands and parents, shamed by their communi-
ties, and blamed for the attack, Halima did not tell her husband of the attack. Id.; see also 
Wagner, supra note 4, at 205. He deduced what happened, however, from her two-day dis-
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 Then, in October 2006, the Janjaweed found Halima again; this 
time the militia preyed upon a group of women as they gathered fire-
wood. 10  The Janjaweed ripped Halima’s infant daughter from her 
arms, and called her a “monkey” and “not human” while gang raping 
her, beating her, and stealing her clothes.11 This time, however, the 
fault for Halima’s brutalization does not lie solely with the Janjaweed 
and the Sudanese government.12 This note argues that fault also lies 
with the entire international community, with all of the countries and 
organizations and people who have spent four years either ignoring 
the worsening genocide in Darfur or doing shockingly little to stop 
it. 13  If the international community had intervened, as stories of 
atrocity after atrocity continued to surface over the past four years, 
Halima may not have had to endure a second nightmarish attack at 
                                                                                                                      
appearance, and soon after left her to grow crops. Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
The area to which he traveled was later attacked by the Janjaweed, and he had not been 
heard from as of November 2006. Id. 
10 Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. The culture and habits of the black African 
tribes in Darfur have, ironically, helped facilitate the attacks on women. See Wagner, supra 
note 4, at 203. Men are rarely in the villages; they traditionally work outside the villages for 
long stretches of time, leaving women to assume many of the daily tasks necessary for sur-
vival. Eileen Meier, Prosecuting Sexual Violence Crimes During War and Conflict: New Possibilities 
for Progress, 10 Int’l Legal Theory 83, 119 (2004); Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 
2. Since the attacks by the Janjaweed began in 2003, this role has become much more pre-
carious for women. Meier, supra, at 119; Wagner, supra note 4, at 206; Kristof, The Face of 
Genocide, supra note 2. Many of their duties, such as gathering firewood, make them vul-
nerable to attack by the Janjaweed. Meier, supra, at 119; Wagner, supra note 4, at 206; Kris-
tof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. The majority of women who have reported their 
rapes stated that they were engaged in their normal daily activities when they were at-
tacked. Wagner, supra note 4, at 206. Furthermore, men often flee when villages are at-
tacked by the Janjaweed, knowing that they will be killed if caught. Meier, supra, at 119; 
Wagner, supra note 4, at 203. This leaves women, who are much less mobile because of 
their responsibilities caring for children and the elderly, in the villages, without any protec-
tion from the Janjaweed. Wagner, supra note 4, at 203; Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra 
note 2. The prevailing thought in Darfur is that since the Janjaweed kill men but “only” 
rape women, it is better to put the women at risk. Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
11 Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
12 See Klinton W. Alexander, Ignoring the Lessons of the Past: The Crisis in Darfur and the 
Case for Humanitarian Intervention, 15 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 1, 3 (2005). 
13 See Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government 
and Militia Forces in Western Sudan 50 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 
2004/sudan0504/sudan0504simple.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Darfur De-
stroyed]; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Bandages and Bayonets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2006, at 
D13; Nicholas D. Kristof, Sudan’s Department of Gang Rape, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2005, at A23. 
For purposes of this note, “international community” is defined as the U.N., the United 
States, and other advanced countries. See Nadia A. Deans, Comment, Tragedy of Humanity: The 
Issue of Intervention in the Darfur Crisis, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1653, 1654 (2005). 
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the hands of the Janjaweed.14 But the international community did 
not intervene, and our complacency in the face of genocide has be-
come as horrific as the attacks themselves.15 As Halima and the Dajo 
women and all the women of Darfur struggle to survive, the rest of 
the world has closed its eyes.16 We refuse to see that women continue 
to bear the brunt of the violence in Darfur, that women are being vio-
lently raped in public, beaten like animals, and left with horrific and 
permanent injuries.17 We choose to ignore that women are being tar-
geted for attack because of their gender, and then, after enduring 
physical brutalization, are being abandoned and ostracized by their 
families, forced to relive their trauma alone every day.18 As the first 
genocide of the twenty-first century ravages Darfur, the world has 
turned its collective head.19 
 This note argues that the international community must immedi-
ately respond to the ongoing genocide in Darfur with decisive criminal 
prosecutions and holistic reparations, to both repay the women of Dar-
fur for years of international ignorance of their suffering and to protect 
                                                                                                                      
14 Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
15 Nicholas D. Kristof, Never Again, Again?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2005, at D13; Kristof, 
Sudan’s Department of Gang Rape, supra note 13; Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
16 Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
17 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 3; Nicholas D. Kristof, A Tolerable Genocide, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 27, 2005, at D11; Nicholas D. Kristof, If Not Now, When?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 
2006, at D13. 
18 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 211; Kristof, Bandages and Bayonets, supra note 13; Kristof, 
Sudan’s Department of Gang Rape, supra note 13; Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
19 Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. International criminal law describes geno-
cide as crimes against humanity committed with the specific intention of exterminating a 
certain civilian population based on the population’s race, nationality, religion, or ethnic-
ity. David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the U.N. 
Report, 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 303, 308, 316 (2006). Under the Rome Statute, which governs the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), genocide includes “[c]ausing serious bodily or men-
tal harm to members of the group,” “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” and “[i]mposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group.” Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 1–128, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 93, available at http://www.un.org/ 
law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The rape of the women of Dar-
fur constitutes genocide under both of these definitions. See Tara Gingerich & Jennifer 
Leaning, The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan 8 
(2004), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/the-
use-of-rape-as-a-weapon.pdf. The rapes are committed with the specific intention of exter-
minating and physically destroying the African tribes of Darfur by preventing reproduction 
and polluting bloodlines. See id. Rape can also be prosecuted as a war crime or a crime 
against humanity, which are international crimes of lesser severity, but for purposes of this 
note, it will be assumed that the rapes in Darfur constitute genocide. See Rome Statute, 
supra, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 93–98. 
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them from future harms. Part I explores the use of rape in the Darfu-
rian genocide and details the physical, emotional, social, and economic 
consequences that widespread and systematic rape has had on the 
women of Darfur. Part II examines the history of international criminal 
prosecutions for rape, the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), and the ICC’s ongoing investigation in Darfur, which re-
sulted in the court’s first indictments of Sudanese war criminals in Feb-
ruary 2007. Part II details potential obstacles faced by the ICC in the 
prosecutions of these defendants and concludes that while ICC prose-
cutions are necessary and will be effective in the long run, they present 
a problem of delayed justice for the women of Darfur. Finally, Part III 
argues that the women of Darfur deserve more immediate and holistic 
forms of justice beyond the legal justice offered by the ICC. Part III 
suggests that the international community must repay the women of 
Darfur for years of keeping our eyes closed to their plight and for our 
inability to bring them immediate justice through international courts. 
This note proposes that as an apology for our willful ignorance, the in-
ternational community must assist the women of Darfur through im-
mediate humanitarian aid, financial reparations, and political and mili-
tary solutions. 
I. The Destruction of Darfur 
It is . . . rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the 
victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape 
to make you leave your home and never want to go back. It is rape to be seen 
and heard and watched and told to others: rape as spectacle. It is rape to 
drive a wedge through the community, to shatter a society, to destroy a peo-
ple. It is rape as genocide. 
—Catherine A. MacKinnon20 
A. A Conflict Defined By Sexual Violence 
 Sudan’s recent history is scarred with political instability and in-
ternal religion-based strife.21 For much of the past two decades, a civil 
war raged between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, an armed 
group of black African tribes in the predominantly Christian southern 
part of the country, and the country’s Islamic central government in 
                                                                                                                      
20  Catherine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights, 17 Harv. 
Women’s L.J. 5, 11–12 (1994). 
21 Wagner, supra note 4, at 195. 
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Khartoum.22 Then, in the 1990s, disagreements over land use in Darfur 
emerged between the black Muslim African tribes who farm there and 
the nomadic Arab groups who wanted the land for grazing.23 This strife 
coincided with the arrival of a hard-line, racist Islamic government––
led by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who took power in a military 
coup in 1989––that supported Arabic supremacy over the African tribes 
and granted disproportionate power to the Arab groups in Darfur.24 
Eventually, in 2003, two rebel groups––the Sudan Liberation Movement 
and the Justice and Equality Movement, both composed mostly of 
members of black African tribes––took up arms against government 
targets in Darfur, demanding more rights for the settled African popu-
lation. 25  The government responded with overwhelming and brutal 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 6; Wagner, supra note 4, at 195; see also Jamal 
Jafari, “Never Again,” Again: Darfur, the Genocide Convention, and the Duty to Prevent Genocide, 
Hum. Rts. Brief, Fall 2004, at 8, 8. This civil war came to a tenuous end with the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, although there have been delays 
in the implementation of this agreement. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of African Affairs, 
Background Note: Sudan, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm [hereinafter U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Background Note]. 
23 See International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, ¶¶ 60–62, U.N. Doc S/2005/60 ( Jan. 25, 2005), available at http:// 
www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter Commission of Inquiry 
Report]; Jafari, supra note 22, at 8; Wagner, supra note 4, at 197. Darfur is a predominantly 
desert region in far west Sudan, bordered by Chad and the Central African Republic. U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Background Note, supra note 22. Some experts note that the strife has roots 
in Darfur’s long-running environmental crises, including droughts and resulting famines 
in the 1980s that brought about increasing competition for resources between the black 
African farmers and the Arab herders. See Lydia Polgreen, A Godsend for Darfur, or a Curse?, 
N.Y. Times, July 22, 2007, at D1. In July 2007, researchers at Boston University discovered a 
huge underground lake beneath the barren land of northern Darfur. Id. While some ex-
perts, including U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, believe that this discovery could 
help bring an end to the violence in the region by reducing competition for resources, 
others suggest that the lake will likely become an additional source of conflict. Id. 
24 See Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶¶ 59, 62; U.S. Dep’t of State, Back-
ground Note, supra note 22. The Sudanese government, headquartered in the capital of 
Khartoum, has historically neglected Darfur, located nearly a thousand miles to the west. 
Physicians for Human Rights, Darfur—Assault on Survival: A Call for Security, 
Justice, and Restitution 9 (2006), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/li- 
brary/report-sudan-2006.html. President al-Bashir’s government has staffed the police, mili-
tary, and judiciary in Darfur with non-Darfurians who are loyal to Khartoum. Id. 
25 See Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 62; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, 
at 6; see also Alexander, supra note 12, at 36 (the rebel groups blame the central government 
for the region’s problems and claim they are being marginalized). The turning point oc-
curred in early 2003 when the rebel groups ambushed the Sudanese Air Force at a base in 
northern Darfur, embarrassing the Sudanese government and giving way to more brutal 
attacks. See Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶¶ 63, 64; see also Human Rights 
Watch, Q & A: Crisis in Darfur, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05/darfur8536_txt. 
htm (last updated Sept. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Q & A]. 
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military force that did not target the rebels but rather purposely at-
tacked all Darfurians. 26 The government directed Sudanese military 
personnel to carry out these attacks, and in a deliberate attempt to ex-
ploit the long-simmering tension between the Arab and African groups, 
also recruited nomadic Arabs to form the armed militias that came to 
be known as the Janjaweed.27 
 Together, the Janjaweed and the Sudanese government have spent 
the past five years destroying the black African population in the Dar-
fur region.28 The government has orchestrated widespread attacks on 
civilians, ordering the Janjaweed to bomb villages, murder men, rape 
and torture women, abduct children, burn homes, and loot crops and 
cattle.29 These attacks, which are obviously blatant and massive human 
rights violations, are committed in a systematic manner, often in coor-
dination with Sudanese soldiers and the Sudanese Air Force. 30 The 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed, supra note 13, at 7; Alexander, su-
pra note 12, at 36; Wagner, supra note 4, at 198–99. There are reports that the African rebel 
forces are also responsible for separate attacks on civilians, but there is no definitive evi-
dence on this point. Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 190. 
27 Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed, supra note 13, at 7–8; see Wagner, supra 
note 4, at 198. The link between the Janjaweed and the Sudanese government is well-
documented. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 198; see also Lipscomb, supra note 4, at 189. Hu-
man Rights Watch has obtained numerous documents showing the government’s high-
level involvement in recruiting and arming the Janjaweed. Wagner, supra note 4, at 198–99. 
See generally Human Rights Watch, Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy 
of Militia Support 6 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/072004 
darfur.pdf (discussing numerous Sudanese government documents and interviews with 
eyewitnesses and victims, all of which describe the “hand-in-glove” manner in which the 
government and the Janjaweed have operated). The Sudanese government denies this 
connection, and has repeatedly claimed that the Janjaweed are simply independent, un-
controllable militias acting on the traditional tensions in the region. See Elizabeth Rubin, If 
Not Peace, Then Justice, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 46. 
28 Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 72; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 
4; Jafari, supra note 22, at 8. The violence halted temporarily in May 2006 with the signing 
of a cease-fire agreement between the central government and a faction of the Sudan Lib-
eration Movement––known as the Darfur Peace Agreement––but the deadlines of the deal 
were never met and the agreement, now called “flawed,” ended up making the violence 
worse. See Nicholas D. Kristof, How Do You Solve a Crisis Like Darfur?, N.Y. Times, March 13, 
2007, at A19; Nicholas D. Kristof, When Genocide Worsens, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2006, at D13; 
Human Rights Watch, Q & A, supra note 25. 
29 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 4; Human Rights Watch, Q & A, supra note 25; see also 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Sudan: Country Reports of Human Rights Practices—2005 
(2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61594.htm [hereinafter U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Sudan: Country Reports]. 
30 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 4. See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Sudan: Coun-
try Reports, supra note 29. Amnesty International reports that most of the Janjaweed are 
incorporated into the Sudanese army and the Popular Defense Forces, a government pa-
ramilitary force. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 6. 
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government’s “divide and rule” tactics have destabilized the social 
structure of communities and have allowed the government to control 
the civilians of Darfur through fear, while denying any responsibility for 
any of the atrocities.31 In total, as of the fall of 2007, the Sudanese gov-
ernment and the Janjaweed have killed as many as 500,000 people and 
displaced at least 2.2 million others.32 
 What these numbers do not reveal, however, are the women, like 
Halima, whose lives will never be the same.33 The use of rape as a de-
liberate military tactic and weapon of war has destroyed Darfur in a 
way that no other crime could.34 There is no way to know how many 
women have been victims of sexual violence at the hands of the Jan-
jaweed, and how many women continue to suffer because of physical 
injuries, economic losses, and the loneliness of ostracization.35 The 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 8. In addition to providing military and logistical 
support to the Janjaweed, the Sudanese government has also squelched any resistance 
from black Africans in the region, including human rights workers, lawyers, and village 
leaders, through arbitrary arrests, forced detentions, unfair trials, cruel punishments, and 
torture. See id. at 4. 
32 Karen Hirschfeld, Sudan Coordinator for Physicians for Human Rights, Public Ad-
dress at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Genocide in Darfur: Roots of the Con-
flict and the Current Stalemate (Mar. 1, 2007); Human Rights Watch, Q & A, supra note 
25. The number of dead ranges from 200,000 to 500,000; the higher number includes 
deaths at the hands of the Janjaweed as well as deaths from disease and malnutrition 
brought on by the genocide. Hirschfeld, supra. Some experts estimate that the death toll 
could reach one million if the genocide continues. Nicholas D. Kristof, Why Genocide Mat-
ters, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2006, at D13. However, this conflict is about more than just the 
body count. Id. At least two million people have become internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), forced to move to other towns or villages in Darfur, and at least 232,000 are refu-
gees across the border in Chad. Human Rights Watch, Q & A, supra note 25. All refugees 
and displaced persons remain vulnerable to more attacks by the Janjaweed. Id.; see also 
Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 5; M. Rafiqul Islam, The Sudanese Darfur 
Crisis and Internally Displaced Persons in International Law: The Least Protection for the Most Vul-
nerable, 18 Int’l J. Refugee L. 354, 356–57 (2006). The Chadian refugee camps are dan-
gerously understaffed and provide only spotty access to humanitarian aid. See Lisa Avery, 
The Women and Children in Conflict Protection Act: An Urgent Call for Leadership and the Preven-
tion of Intentional Victimization of Women and Children in War, 51 Loy. L. Rev. 103, 118 
(2005). IDPs, who are not afforded the same protections under international law as refu-
gees, are also extremely susceptible to illness, as they have no access to humanitarian aid, 
little food or medicine, and no secure shelter. Id. at 121; Islam, supra, at 356–57. In addi-
tion to refugees and IDPs, human rights groups estimate that there are an additional two 
million “conflict-affected” individuals in Darfur who require some form of food assistance 
because of the damage the genocide has caused to the Darfurian economy. Human Rights 
Watch, Q & A, supra note 25. 
33 Wagner, supra note 4, at 193. 
34 See id. at 242; Gingerich & Leaning, supra note 19, at 1. 
35 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 29; U.S. Dep’t of State, Sudan: Country Re-
ports, supra note 29. An August 2004 report by the U.S. State Department indicated that 
sixteen percent of Darfurians interviewed had experienced or witnessed a rape, a high 
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attacks themselves are bad enough, but when combined with these 
uniquely horrific after-effects, the continuing sexual violence in Dar-
fur amounts to genocide, a genocide in which the international com-
munity must intervene in order to protect the women of Darfur.36 
                                                                                                                      
number for a historically underreported crime. Jafari, supra note 22, at 9. Some scholars 
believe that such statistics, based mostly on refugee interviews, severely underestimate the 
extent to which rape is being perpetrated against civilians in the region. Wagner, supra 
note 4, at 204. The stigma and shame attached to rape in Sudanese culture, as well as the 
ostracism from the community that typically follows it, prevent most women from report-
ing their rapes, or even discussing rape with human rights workers. Amnesty Int’l, supra 
note 4, at 11, 16; see also Wagner, supra note 4, at 204–05. In many cases, even if women 
wanted to report what was done to them, there is no one to investigate or prosecute the 
perpetrators. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 25. In several cases, community leaders 
reported to Amnesty International that they attempted to report a rape by the Janjaweed 
to local police, only to have the police ignore them or, worse, to be arrested for spreading 
false information, to have the police force the victim to undergo a medical examination, 
or to have the Janjaweed attack the police station and kill the remaining police. Id.; see also 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Sudan: Country Reports, supra note 29; Commission of Inquiry 
Report, supra note 23, ¶ 425. 
36 See Avery, supra note 32, at 110; Sackellares, supra note 6, at 156. I believe that the 
events in Darfur fit the criteria for genocide. See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 156; see also supra 
note 19. Most human rights organization have declared the events in Darfur to be a geno-
cide. See generally Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4 (noting that there is a large amount of evi-
dence of massive human rights violations in Darfur); Human Rights Watch, Q & A, supra 
note 25 (describing a systematic campaign of “ethnic cleansing”). However, the international 
community, particularly the United States and the U.N., has been reluctant to deem Darfur a 
genocide. Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 518; Alexander, supra note 12, at 
38; Dawn Yamane Hewett, Recent Development, Sudan’s Courts and Complementarity in the Face 
of Darfur, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 276, 276 (2006). The United States first referred to the events in 
Darfur as genocide when then-Secretary of State Colin Powell used the term in a speech in 
September 2004. Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 10, 2004, at A1. After hesitating to use the term publicly for several years, Presi-
dent Bush referred to Darfur as a genocide in May 2007. Rubin, supra note 27; Alex Perry, 
Will Sanctions End the Darfur Killings?, Time in Partnership with CNN, May 29, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1626020,00.html?id=feed-cnn-topics. In Jan- 
uary 2005, the U.N.’s International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, an investigatory body 
created in October 2004, declined to label the events decisively as a genocide. Commission of 
Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 518; Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 12. 
Some scholars believe that the U.N.’s reluctance to use the term “genocide” is due to the 
resistance of China and Russia––two powerful U.N. members that have extremely close ties to 
Sudanese oil and military interests and that do not want to anger or embarrass the Sudanese 
government. Nsongurua J. Udombana, An Escape from Reason: Genocide and the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 40 Int’l L. 41, 63 (2006); see Deans, supra note 13, at 1691. 
Others believe that the U.N. is reluctant to use the term because of its association with the 
need for immediate and decisive action. See Joshua M. Kagan, Comment, The Obligation to Use 
Force to Stop Acts of Genocide: An Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary Norms, and State Responsi-
bility, 7 San Diego Int’l L.J. 461, 481–82 (2006). Labeling the situation in Darfur a genocide 
would result in expectations and obligations on the part of the U.N. to respond with force. 
Kagan, supra, at 482, 484; see also Alexander, supra note 12, at 40 (suggesting that the failure 
to recognize the events as genocide has sparked controversy within the U.N.). The U.N. has 
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When scores of women are raped so violently that they suffer injuries 
preventing them from bearing children or leading them to early 
deaths due to infection, this constitutes an intentional, planned ex-
termination of the women of Darfur.37 When women are forced to 
bear the children of their attackers and forbidden from procreating 
their own tribes, there is a deliberate attempt to destroy an entire ra-
cial group.38 When these rapes take place in public to cause the hu-
miliation and ostracization of women, this constitutes a cruel plan to 
displace cultures and communities.39 This destruction is rape as eth-
nic cleansing, rape as genocide.40 This destruction is, as then-United 
Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, said in 
March 2004, “the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis.”41 
B. The Effects of Rape on the Women of Darfur 
 The Janjaweed’s decision to rape the women of Darfur as part of 
their genocidal war is a massacre without murder, a deliberate and cal-
culated plan designed to have particularly severe and long-lasting ef-
fects on the female population and, by extension, on the society as a 
whole.42 They engage in gang rapes, with multiple men raping women 
                                                                                                                      
instead declared the events in Darfur to constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity—
everything except genocide. See Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶¶ 518–19, 
522. 
37 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 140; see also Rome Statute, supra note 19, 2187 
U.N.T.S. at 93 (defining genocide as “[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group”). 
38  See Rome Statute, supra note 19, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 93 (defining genocide as 
“[i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”); Sackellares, supra 
note 6, at 140; Wagner, supra note 4, at 205 (stating that one notable element of the sexual 
violence against the women of Darfur has been the Janjaweed’s desire to populate the 
region with Arab children and hinder the ability of the African tribes to re-populate them-
selves). 
39  See Rome Statute, supra note 19, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 93 (defining genocide as 
“[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part”); Sackellares, supra note 6, at 140, 157. Rape is 
used not only as an attack on the woman, but is also intended to humiliate, shame, de-
grade, and terrify the entire ethnic group. Wagner, supra note 4, at 205, 211. 
40 Meier, supra note 10, at 125; Sackellares, supra note 6, at 138; Wagner, supra note 4, 
at 205, 211. Scholars have distinguished rape from other forms of genocidal crimes be-
cause of its unique impact on women. See Veronica C. Abreu, Women’s Bodies as Battlefields in 
the Former Yugoslavia: An Argument for the Prosecution of Sexual Terrorism as Genocide and for the 
Recognition of Genocidal Sexual Terrorism as a Violation of Jus Cogens Under International Law, 6 
Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 16 (2005). 
41 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 3. 
42 See Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dilemmas and Directions, 12 
Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 335, 335–36 (2006) [hereinafter Cahn, Dilemmas and Direc-
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multiple times, with vaginal and anal penetration and penetration with 
objects. 43  They use rape as a form of torture, beating and cutting 
women, breaking their legs, pulling out their fingernails, mutilating their 
genitals, and holding them as sex slaves, often as a tactic to try to force 
the women to reveal where their husbands are hiding.44 The Janjaweed 
rape indiscriminately, attacking girls as young as eight and women as 
old as eighty, single women, married women, pregnant women.45 The 
Janjaweed also use rape deliberately as a tool of ethnic cleansing; nu-
merous reports speak of forced pregnancies, with the Janjaweed telling 
victims that they are being raped to create Arab children and to wipe 
out the black African tribes.46 
 But the impact of these rapes goes beyond the immediate physical 
brutalization; for the women of Darfur, rape has long-term and life-
threatening consequences.47 For the Janjaweed, rape is strategic dehu-
manization; they often rape women in public or in front of their hus-
bands, parents, or children in an attempt to destroy families and com-
munities.48 They use rape to intimidate, creating a population stricken 
by fear, a population afraid to leave its villages, afraid to engage in eco-
nomic activity, afraid to live.49 Women must live with the scars of rape in 
a country that stigmatizes rape victims as at fault, refuses to prosecute 
their attackers, and, most dangerously, that has virtually no medical fa-
                                                                                                                      
tions]; see also Naomi Cahn, Beyond Retribution and Impunity: Responding to War Crimes of Sex-
ual Violence, 1 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties 217, 218 (2005) [hereinafter Cahn, Beyond 
Retribution]; Sackellares, supra note 6, at 138. This calculated decision to rape is bolstered 
by the Janjaweed’s perception that they have a license to rape because sexual violence is an 
accepted practice during wartime. See Fleming Terrell, Unofficial Accountability: A Proposal 
for the Permanent Women’s Tribunal on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, 15 Tex. J. Women & L. 
107, 109, 114 (2005). 
43 Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶¶ 333–34; Gingerich & Leaning, 
supra note 19, at 15; Meier, supra note 10, at 120. 
44 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; Meier, supra note 10, at 120; Sackellares, supra 
note 6, at 157; Wagner, supra note 4, at 207. 
45 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 12; Sackellares, supra note 6, at 138. 
46 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 140; Andrea R. Phelps, Note, Gender-Based War Crimes: 
Incidence and Effectiveness of International Criminal Prosecution, 12 Wm. & Mary J. Women & 
L. 499, 503 (2006); Wagner, supra note 4, at 205, 211. 
47 See Avery, supra note 32, at 110. 
48 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 140; Wagner, supra note 4, at 193, 205. 
49 See Gingerich & Leaning, supra note 19, at 15; Meier, supra note 10, at 121. In one 
infamous attack, well-documented by human rights organizations, the Sudanese military 
and the Janjaweed stormed the northern Darfur town of Tawila, surrounded a boarding 
school that housed 110 girls, and eventually raped at least forty-one students and teachers 
in one day. Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 339; Wagner, supra note 4, at 
204. 
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cilities to treat their injuries.50 These lingering effects make rape the 
most devastating and premeditated tactic of the Janjaweed––rape and 
its after-effects are destroying the very core of Darfurian society and 
forcing women to live alone, broken, in its rubble.51 It is these physical, 
psychological, social, and economic consequences that demonstrate 
why rape is the first aspect of the Darfur genocide that the interna-
tional community should be most intent on eliminating.52 
1. Physical and Psychological Effects 
 The majority of women raped in Darfur suffer horrific physical 
injuries.53 The Janjaweed rape violently, often raping women multiple 
times in a row and penetrating them with sticks and bayonets.54 Fol-
lowing the rapes, the Janjaweed have attempted to cause further in-
jury by firing bullets into women’s vaginas, among other atrocities.55 If 
the women survive, they often are left with serious medical condi-
tions, most frequently an injury known as a traumatic gynecological 
fistula.56 A gynecological fistula occurs when the wall between the va-
gina and the bladder or bowel is ruptured, leaving women inconti-
nent and highly susceptible to infection.57 Fistulas are all but unheard 
                                                                                                                      
50 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 258; Sackellares, supra note 6, at 140; 
Wagner, supra note 4, at 205. 
51 See Cahn, Dilemmas and Directions, supra note 42, at 335–36 (arguing that women are 
affected differently by armed conflict due to their second-class status in most war-torn 
countries and their role as the primary caretakers of homes and families). 
52 See id. at 337, 358–59. Some argue that rape should be at the very top of any criminal 
prosecutions against the perpetrators of the Darfur genocide. Wagner, supra note 4, at 194, 
212. 
53 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18. The severity of these injuries is increased due to 
the widespread practice of female genital mutilation in Sudan. Id. Most women in Darfur 
are circumcised, and a large number are infibulated, making intercourse extremely pain-
ful and dangerous and greatly increasing the risk of injury. Id.; Gingerich & Leaning, 
supra note 19, at 20; see also Wagner, supra note 4, at 213; Kristof, Sudan’s Department of Gang 
Rape, supra note 13. 
54 Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶¶ 333–34; Kristof, Sudan’s Depart-
ment of Gang Rape, supra note 13. 
55 Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 232. 
56 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; The ACQUIRE Project, Traumatic Gynecological 
Fistula: A Consequence of Sexual Violence in Conflict Settings 3 (2006), available at http://www. 
acquireproject.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ACQUIRE/Publications/TF_Report_final_version. 
pdf; U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (U.N. OCHA), Sudan: Fighting 
Fistula in Khartoum, Jan. 23, 2007, http://irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportID=57172 [herein-
after U.N. OCHA, Fighting Fistula]. 
57 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; The ACQUIRE Project, supra note 56, at 3; 
U.N. OCHA, Fighting Fistula, supra note 56. Women suffering from gynecological fistulas 
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of in the developed world, and typically occur in the third world only 
as a result of problematic labor and delivery.58 In Darfur, however, 
they have increasingly become a common conflict-related injury.59 It 
is unknown how many women suffer from gynecological fistulas in 
Darfur.60 All that is known is that the women who have developed fis-
tulas after being raped are suffering horribly and alone, having been 
shunned by their families and communities.61 
 Compounding the problem of fistulas and other rape injuries is the 
lack of adequate medical facilities in Darfur that can provide compre-
hensive medical care to rape victims.62 While fistulas can be easily re-
paired with surgery, surgical facilities are virtually non-existent in the 
remote villages, makeshift communities, and desperate refugee camps 
where many Darfurians currently live.63 There are no sanitary products 
that can help women with fistulas avoid their high risk of infection, nor 
are there the necessary rehabilitation services that would allow them to 
remain part of the community.64 In addition, the sheer number of rapes 
has very likely led to a significant spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexu-
ally transmitted diseases, none of which are being protected against or 
treated.65 As a result, the women of Darfur are essentially left to fend for 
themselves against a litany of public health crises.66 
 In addition to the horrific physical effects, many of the rape vic-
tims in Darfur, like rape victims all around the world, suffer profound 
                                                                                                                      
are unable to control excretion and constantly smell of urine and feces, making it impossi-
ble for them to leave their homes. See U.N. OCHA, Fighting Fistula, supra note 56. 
58 The ACQUIRE Project, supra note 56, at 3; see U.N. OCHA, Fighting Fistula, supra 
note 56. 
59 See The ACQUIRE Project, supra note 56, at 9–10. 
60 See id. Between 2003 and 2004, 300 women sought treatment for fistulas at Darfur’s 
largest hospital; this number is only a small fraction of those affected by fistula, as it is be-
lieved that most women do not seek treatment. Id. 
61 See U.N. OCHA, Fighting Fistula, supra note 56. 
62 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; The ACQUIRE Project, supra note 56, at 10. 
63 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; The ACQUIRE Project, supra note 56, at 10. 
There is only one hospital in Darfur that practices fistula repair, and it can handle only the 
simplest cases. The ACQUIRE Project, supra note 56, at 10. Most women would need to 
travel to better-equipped hospitals in Chad or Kenya for the surgery. Id. 
64 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; The ACQUIRE Project, supra note 56, at 10. 
65 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; Wagner, supra note 4, at 212. While there are 
no statistics available about HIV/AIDS transmission in Sudan, some speculate that the 
transmission rate is alarmingly high. Wagner, supra note 4, at 212. Some have compared 
the rapes in Darfur to the widespread rapes that were part of the Rwandan genocide in the 
mid-1990s. Sackellares, supra note 6, at 141; Wagner, supra note 4, at 212. Seventy percent 
of all women raped during that conflict are believed to have contracted HIV. Sackellares, 
supra note 6, at 141; Wagner, supra note 4, at 212. 
66 See Cahn, Dilemmas and Directions, supra note 42, at 337. 
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psychological consequences.67 They often experience depression and 
post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as feelings of abandonment, iso-
lation, guilt, and constant fear.68 And without access to psychological 
care, there is little hope for these women ever to recover fully.69 
2. Social and Economic Effects 
 Darfurian women who are victimized by the Janjaweed’s brutality, 
even the few who escape serious physical injuries, must deal with tangi-
ble social and economic ramifications. 70 Rape carries such a strong 
stigma in Sudanese society that victims are nearly universally shamed 
and cast out of their families.71 Rape victims who are married are often 
abandoned by their husbands and forced to raise their children–– in-
cluding, often, their rapist’s child––alone, without any type of income; 
those who are still single are typically deemed unfit for marriage and 
fated to a difficult life.72 Other victims have been separated from their 
families, perhaps permanently, and forced to flee to remote IDP or 
refugee camps.73 These destructive after-effects are not a byproduct of 
the sexual violence, but rather are the primary motivation for the at-
tacks.74 The Janjaweed are acutely aware of the ramifications of rape, 
                                                                                                                      
67 Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 233; Cahn, Dilemmas and Directions, supra 
note 42, at 359. 
68 Cahn, Dilemmas and Directions, supra note 42, at 359; Jamie O’Connell, Gambling with 
the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violations Console Their Victims, 46 Harv. Int’l L. J. 
295, 306 (2005). 
69 Cahn, Dilemmas and Directions, supra note 42, at 359. The lack of psychological care 
for rape victims stems from the overall lack of mental health facilities in Darfur, but also 
from the traditional beliefs about rape in Sudan. See id. In a country where rape is rarely 
recognized as a crime and victims are blamed and ostracized, there is obviously little 
thought given to the psychological needs of victims. See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 
42, at 233; Cahn, Dilemmas and Directions, supra note 42, at 359–60. 
70 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 212; see also Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 
218 (arguing that women are disproportionately affected, politically and economically); 
Cahn, Dilemmas and Directions, supra note 42, at 336–37 (stating that women struggle for 
economic survival during and after wars). 
71 See O’Connell, supra note 68, at 312; Wagner, supra note 4, at 213. O’Connell notes 
that sexual violence is an especially powerful tool for humiliation and shame. O’Connell, 
supra note 68, at 312. See generally Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2 (explaining that 
Halima was abandoned by her husband after he discovered that she was raped by the Jan-
jaweed). 
72 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 213; Lydia Polgreen, Darfur’s Babies of Rape Are on Trial 
From Birth, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2005, at A8. 
73 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 234. 
74 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 212. 
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and use it deliberately to dismantle the family and social relationships 
at the core of Darfurian society.75 
 The after-shocks of widespread rape are already clearly visible in 
the Darfurian economy.76 Economic activity in the region has essen-
tially stalled.77 Traditionally, the men of Darfur control the farming and 
agriculture essential to families’ survival, while Darfurian women trans-
port, prepare, and sell the food and other goods.78 As the conflict in 
Darfur has raged on, however, intensifying fears of rape and physical 
abuse have drastically impacted women’s ability to participate in this 
economic cycle.79 Now, when women do engage in the work outside of 
the home that is necessary to keep their families alive, such as gather-
ing firewood, they do so with the knowledge that they will most likely be 
beaten, raped, or killed.80 The women of Darfur have been left unpro-
tected, without resources, and with no viable opportunities to generate 
income and support themselves and their families.81 They are alone in 
the world.82 
II. Achieving Legal Justice 
There is no hope for sustainable peace in Darfur without immediate access 
to justice. 
—Louise Arbour, former U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights83 
 Rape has been used as a tactic of war for centuries, but it is only in 
the last decade that it has been fully recognized to be as evil as mass 
killings and other atrocities.84 The international community has come 
to agree that widespread and systematic rape of women can constitute 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Avery, supra note 32, at 113. 
76 Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 346. 
77 See id.; Human Rights Watch, Q & A, supra note 25; see also Cahn, Dilemmas and Direc-
tions, supra note 42, at 337. 
78 See Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 346; Wagner, supra note 4, at 206. 
79 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 18; Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 
23, ¶ 346. 
80 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 206; Kristof, The Face of Genocide, supra note 2. 
81 See Avery, supra note 32, at 105. 
82 See Jafari, supra note 22, at 9. 
83 Jon M. Van Dyke, Promoting Accountability for Human Rights Abuses, 8 Chap. L. Rev. 
153, 173 (2005). 
84 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 149; Phelps, supra note 46, at 500; Wagner, supra note 
4, at 214–15. International recognition of rape is a new phenomenon; until recently, in-
ternational human rights law was a reflection of only the male experience in armed con-
flict. Sackellares, supra note 6, at 137. 
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genocide or, at the very least, a war crime and a crime against human-
ity.85 In recent years, the international community, led by the U.N., has 
made great strides in targeting and prosecuting sexual violence against 
women in internal conflicts.86 Beginning with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and continuing 
through the development of the Rome Statute, the establishment of 
the ICC, and the current investigation and indictments by ICC, the in-
ternational community has taken great steps to protect women when 
individual countries cannot or will not.87 This protection must now be 
extended to the women of Darfur.88 There must be vigorous prosecu-
tion of the perpetrators of the Darfurian genocide, with prosecutions of 
rape and sexually violent crimes at the forefront.89 
A. The Recognition of Rape as a Crime of War 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) an-
nounced the international criminal justice community’s first clear 
condemnations of the use of rape as a weapon of war.90 The tribunals 
are independent, temporary courts run by the U.N. that, for the first 
time, prosecute both the direct perpetrators of international crimes 
and the government officials who enable them.91 A hallmark of both 
tribunals is the recognition of the unique victimization of women dur-
ing armed conflict and the resulting careful prosecution of those who 
order, permit, or commit crimes of sexual violence.92 The ICTY and 
the ICTR represent a new way of dealing with rape as a war crime, tak-
ing a victim-centered approach and focusing on justice for the women 
rather than pursuing sometimes impossible or harmful prosecu-
                                                                                                                      
85 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 137; see also discussion supra note 36. In the context 
of war, mass rape is a uniquely effective tool for undermining the social order of a region. 
Gingerich & Leaning, supra note 19, at 8. 
86 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 148–53; Wagner, supra note 4, at 210. 
87 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 148–53. 
88 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 194. 
89 Id. 
90 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 149. The ICTY was established in 1993 after the con-
flict in Yugoslavia ended; the ICTR was set up in 1994 after the civil war in Rwanda sub-
sided. See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 147–48; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
General Information, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). Sackel-
lares states that the tribunals’ focus on sexual violence stemmed in part from worldwide 
media attention on mass rapes and pressure from feminists and women’s organizations. 
Sackellares, supra note 6, at 148–49. 
91 Sackellares, supra note 6, at 147–50. 
92 See id. at 148–50. 
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tions.93 The ICTY is known for changing the way the international 
community looks at sexual violence, particularly systematic rape dur-
ing armed conflict.94 The ICTR is responsible for the recognition that 
rape can be prosecuted as genocide and a crime against humanity 
and for demonstrating to the international legal community that such 
prosecutions stand as dramatic statements that there will be no impu-
nity for sexual violence. 95 This legal significance, however, has not 
been enough to deter the ongoing genocide in Darfur.96 
B. The Role of the International Criminal Court 
1. Establishment of the ICC 
 After the ICTY and ICTR, the international criminal justice com-
munity recognized the need for a permanent international court to 
prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.97 In July 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. at 150. The ICTR and ICTY are groundbreaking in their recognition of the 
impact sexual violence crimes have on individual victims. Id.; see Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-
Sensitive Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Lessons Learned for the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 12 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 119, 120 (2005). 
94 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 150. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the defendant, a leader of 
Serbian forces, was acquitted of rape charges, but the case retained significance simply by 
demonstrating that it was possible to bring such charges. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1-A, Judgment ( July 15, 1999); Sackellares, supra note 6, at 150. Prosecutor v. Kunarac 
broadened the definition of rape to require only an unwanted sexual penetration, elimi-
nating the requirement of coercion or force, bringing international law into conformity 
with rape laws in jurisdictions around the world. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-
96-23, IT-96-23/1, Trial Chamber II, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001); Sackellares, supra note 6, at 
151. Kunarac was also significant because it was the first prosecution of a defendant for a 
single act of rape, and also the first to recognize the systematic rape of women as a war 
crime. See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 151. 
95 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 240–41; Sackellares, supra note 6, at 
151. The case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu was groundbreaking because the ICTR defined rape 
and sexual violence for the first time in international criminal history. Prosecutor v. Akay-
esu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998); Sackellares, supra note 6, at 152. In 
Akayesu, the ICTR also considered rape as a method of torture for the first time. See 
Oosterveld, supra note 93, at 120–21, 122; Sackellares, supra note 6, at 152. However, de-
spite these legal milestones, some scholars argue that the ICTR has not had a significant 
impact on the Rwandan people. See Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in 
Rwanda, 31 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 41, 46 (2005). Drumbl argues that the international com-
munity, not Rwandans themselves, have been the greatest beneficiaries of the ICTR and 
that most Rwandans are unaware of the ICTR’s work. Id. at 47. 
96 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 241. 
97  See International Criminal Court: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/ataglance/faq.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2008) [hereinafter ICC: FAQ]. The 
ICTY and ICTR served as laboratories for the ICC. See Mireille Delmas-Marty, Interactions 
Between National and International Criminal Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC, 4 J. 
Int’l Crim. Just. 2, 6 (2006). The ICC is a better solution for dealing with international 
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2002, the U.N. and 104 countries––with the notable exception of the 
United States––entered into effect the Rome Statute, which established 
the ICC.98 The ICC is an unprecedented international tribunal: a per-
manent court coordinated by, but independent of, the U.N. and made 
up of judges and prosecutors from around the world.99 The tribunal 
has jurisdiction to prosecute the most heinous international crimes–– 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide––in nearly every 
country. 100 Most importantly, the ICC, guided by the Rome Statute, 
recognizes widespread and systematic rape as a form of genocide.101 
 The ICC has jurisdiction in any country that is a party to the 
Rome Statute, any country that consents to ICC jurisdiction, or any 
country referred to the court by the U.N. Security Council; combined, 
this essentially covers every country in the world.102 Although Sudan is 
not a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction in Sudan 
due to a U.N. Security Council Referral made in March 2005. 103 
                                                                                                                      
crimes than the ICTY and ICTR because its permanency will make it less expensive to run, 
due to fewer set-up costs in individual countries, and will allow investigations and prosecu-
tions to happen more quickly. See id. at 6; see also Phelps, supra note 46, at 514. 
98 International Criminal Court: About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2008) [hereinafter ICC: About the Court]; see Rome Statute, supra note 
19, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 91–92. Only seven countries refused to sign the Rome Statute––the 
United States, China, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Qatar, and Israel. Human Rights Watch, The 
United States and the International Criminal Court, http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us. 
htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2008). The United States refused to sign the statute because of fear 
that U.S. soldiers could be arrested and prosecuted for war crimes by other countries. Id.; 
see also Beth Stephens, Accountability for International Crimes: The Synergy Between the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and Alternative Remedies, 21 Wis. Int’l L.J. 527, 529–30 (2003). 
99 ICC: About the Court, supra note 98; ICC: Structure of the Court, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/ataglance/structure.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2008); see Stephens, supra note 
98, at 527. 
100 ICC: FAQ, supra note 97; see Sackellares, supra note 6 at 153; Stephens, supra note 
98, at 527. Because the ICC has prospective jurisdiction, it can only prosecute crimes 
committed after July 1, 2002. See Meier, supra note 10, at 105. 
101 See Rome Statute, supra note 19, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 93; Phelps, supra note 46, at 515–
16. The statute provides a list of sexually violent crimes that constitute crimes against hu-
manity, including rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterili-
zation, and “other forms of sexual violence.” Rome Statute, supra note 19, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 
93. When these crimes are committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial, or religious group,” they constitute genocide. Id. The explicit rec-
ognition of these crimes in the statute demonstrates a new, broader way of thinking about 
sexual violence. See Meier, supra note 10, at 84; Oosterveld, supra note 93, at 124. 
102 See Rome Statute, supra note 19, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 91–92, 99; ICC: FAQ, supra note 
97; ICC: How the Court Works, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/works. 
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2008) [hereinafter ICC: How the Court Works]. 
103 Wagner, supra note 4, at 219–20; Int’l Criminal Court, Fact Sheet: The Situa-
tion in Darfur (2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP_Fact-Sheet-
Darfur-20070227_en.pdf [hereinafter ICC, Fact Sheet]. The U.N. Security Council re-
 
2008] Saving the Women of Darfur 221 
Three months after receiving the referral, in June 2005, ICC Prosecu-
tor Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced that the ICC was opening an 
investigation in Darfur, over Sudan’s vehement objections.104 
2. ICC Indictments 
 After a twenty-month investigation, the ICC’s work in Darfur 
reached a crescendo in February 2007, when Moreno-Ocampo an-
nounced indictments against two high-ranking Sudanese officials for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur.105 The indictments 
contain fifty-one counts of atrocious crimes, including rape, murder, 
and torture, against Ahman Muhammad Harun, the former Minister of 
                                                                                                                      
ceived the case in January 2005 from the U.N.’s International Commission of Inquiry for 
Darfur. See Hewett, supra note 36, at 276. See generally Commission of Inquiry Report, supra 
note 23 (concluding that the extent of violence in Darfur required a referral to the Secu-
rity Council). The commission, while declining to find the events in Darfur to be geno-
cide, detailed serious violations of international criminal law in Darfur and sent the names 
of fifty-one individuals, including government and Janjaweed officials, believed to be re-
sponsible to the Security Council for further action. Hewett, supra note 36, at 276–77; 
Rubin, supra note 27. See generally Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23 (detailing 
accounts of the violence and documentation proving the government’s involvement). The 
Security Council gathered further information, including written documentation of the 
atrocities from human rights groups and anti-government activists in Sudan. See Rubin, 
supra note 27. On March 31, 2005, the Security Council voted eleven to zero to officially 
refer Darfur to the ICC, with Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States abstaining. Van 
Dyke, supra note 83, at 174; see Hewett, supra note 36, at 277. Because of its objection to the 
ICC, the United States had threatened to veto the referral, but backed off of this threat, 
stating that it was important for the international community to speak with one voice. Van 
Dyke, supra note 83, at 174. The Security Council’s referral in the face of U.S. opposition 
has been called “remarkable.” Delmas-Marty, supra note 97, at 5. 
104 See Hewett, supra note 36, at 277. Sudan immediately rejected the Security Council’s 
referral to the ICC. Hewett, supra note 36, at 277; Wagner, supra note 4, at 219. President 
al-Bashir repeatedly reaffirmed Sudan’s sovereignty and stated that he would not hand 
over any Sudanese nationals to the court. Hewett, supra note 36, at 277; Wagner, supra note 
4, at 219. The ICC’s decision to go ahead with an investigation and prosecution in Darfur 
over Sudan’s objections has been called a “defining moment” for the court. Van Dyke, 
supra note 83, at 173. 
105 ICC, Fact Sheet, supra note 103. In announcing the indictments, the prosecutor 
stated that he was basing his charges on statements from victims, eyewitnesses, and those with 
knowledge of the government’s activities; documents and other information provided by the 
Sudanese government; the Commission of Inquiry Report; and documents, reports, and 
statements provided by non-governmental organizations. International Criminal Court, 
Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58(7), 3 
(2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP_Summary-Darfur-
20070227_en.pdf [hereinafter ICC, Prosecutor’s Application]; ICC, Fact Sheet, supra 
note 103. The defendants are not being charged with genocide, most likely due to the fact 
that the Commission did not definitively find genocidal intent. Commission of Inquiry Re-
port, supra note 23, ¶ 518 
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State for the Interior of the Government of the Sudan, and Ali Ku-
shayb, a Janjaweed leader.106 Harun allegedly managed and personally 
participated in Janjaweed recruitment, directed Janjaweed activities 
through the “Darfur Security Desk,” and provided funds and weapons 
directly to the Janjaweed, all with the full knowledge that the Janjaweed 
were routinely attacking civilians. 107  Kushayb allegedly commanded 
thousands of Janjaweed members and personally led attacks on civil-
ians––including a mass rape where he personally “inspected” women 
who were tied to trees with their legs apart before being raped repeat-
edly.108 In May 2007, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber ruled on the merits 
of the prosecutor’s evidence against Harun and Kushayb and found 
reasonable grounds to believe that they are criminally responsible for 
the alleged incidents of murder, rape, and torture.109 The ICC also is-
sued arrest warrants for Harun and Kushayb, which serve as a request 
to Sudan and all countries party to the Rome Statute to arrest the de-
fendants and turn them over to the court.110 
 These indictments are an extremely significant step, but, at the 
same time, barely scratch the surface of what needs to be done in Dar-
fur.111 There are many more individuals who need to be investigated 
                                                                                                                      
106 ICC, Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 105, at 1; ICC, Fact Sheet, supra note 
103. The prosecutor’s choice of defendants is significant. See ICC, Fact Sheet, supra note 
103. By including one government official who orchestrated the attacks and one Janjaweed 
leader who carried out the attacks, the prosecutor is showing the depth of the government 
involvement in the attacks. See id. 
107 ICC, Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 105, at 5. Huran was often seen travel-
ing with guards and large boxes of cash, which he distributed directly to the Janjaweed. Id. 
Huran is reportedly currently in Jordan for medical treatment. Sudan Rejects ICC Jurisdic-
tion, Says One Suspect Held, Sudan Trib., Feb. 27, 2007, available at http://www.sudantrib- 
une.com/spip.php?article20473. 
108 ICC, Prosecutor’s Application, supra note 105, at 7. Sudan claims to be investi-
gating Kushayb for international crimes and allegedly has him in custody. Sudan Rejects ICC 
Jurisdiction, supra note 107. The ICC has stated that this is irrelevant because Sudan’s inves-
tigation does not involve the same incidents or conduct cited by the ICC. Press Release, 
International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Presents Evidence on Darfur Crimes (Feb. 
27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/230.html (last visited Jan. 
3, 2008) [hereinafter Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Presents Evidence]. 
109 Prosecutor v. Harun & Al Abd-Ak-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on 
the Prosecution Application Under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ¶¶ 76, 107 (Apr. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-01-07-1_English.pdf. 
110 Prosecutor v. Harun & Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for 
Ahmad Harun (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-
01-07-2_English.pdf; Prosecutor v. Harun & Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant 
of Arrest for Ali Kushayb (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ 
ICC-02-05-01-07-3_English.pdf. 
111 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 218. The U.N. has identified ten high-ranking central 
government officials, seventeen local government officials, fourteen members of the Jan-
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and prosecuted by the ICC, including President al-Bashir himself.112 
Until this happens, however, the ICC must dedicate itself to bringing 
Harun and Kushayb to justice.113 Although the indictments have been 
universally applauded by human rights groups and concerned nations, 
they will be meaningless in stopping and preventing genocide unless 
justice is actually done.114 
3. Obstacles to Effective ICC Prosecutions in Darfur 
 Despite the great progress made by the ICC, there are multiple 
obstacles to the court’s effectiveness.115 As a court of last resort, the ICC 
operates under a complementarity rule: the ICC can exercise its juris-
diction to investigate and prosecute crimes in a country only after it 
determines that the country is unwilling or unable to handle the prose-
cution itself.116 The ICC has determined that Sudan is both unwilling 
and unable to investigate and prosecute the crimes and perpetrators 
identified by the ICC, and thus has declared jurisdiction.117 Sudan dis-
agrees, however, and has attempted to ward off the ICC by establishing 
its own court to investigate crimes in Darfur, called the Special Court 
for Darfur. 118  This court, opened in 2005, has conducted very few 
prosecutions and, in a country that barely acknowledges rape as a 
crime, is not expected to provide justice to any of the women victimized 
                                                                                                                      
jaweed, and seven members of rebel groups as being directly responsible for the atrocities. 
Id. See generally Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23 (noting that numerous indi-
viduals have been directly linked to the violence). Human Rights Watch has also identified 
twenty perpetrators of the violence besides Harun and Kushayb. Human Rights Watch, 
Darfur: Policy of Impunity, http://hrw.org/campaigns/darfur/impunity/list.htm (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2008). The prosecutor acknowledges that he focused on only some of the 
most serious incidents from 2003 to 2004 and only some of the individuals who bear the 
greatest responsibility. Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Ready 
With Evidence Against Darfur War Criminals (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/217.html [hereinafter Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Ready 
With Evidence]. 
112 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, ICC Prosecutor Identifies First Darfur Sus-
pects (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/02/23/darfur15402. 
htm. Because the indictments are so limited, there is some concern that the ICC prosecutor 
is dragging his feet. See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 160–61. 
113 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 112. 
114 See id. 
115 See Wagner, supra note 4, at 220. 
116 Rome Statute, supra note 19, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 100–01; ICC: FAQ, supra note 97. 
117 ICC, Fact Sheet, supra note 103. 
118 See Hewett, supra note 36, at 277; Human Rights Watch, Q & A, supra note 25. 
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by the Janjaweed.119 Many believe that the court completely lacks credi-
bility and will never touch the government officials, military officers, 
and other influential administrators who orchestrated the campaign of 
rape.120 The ICC, according to the February indictments, is confident 
that it can overcome the significant hurdle of Sudan’s resistance and 
continues to press ahead with investigation and prosecution.121 
 Beyond the complementarity issue, however, the ICC faces three 
major limitations to its effectiveness.122 First, the lack of support for 
the court from the United States weakens the ICC’s credibility in the 
eyes of the rest of the world; it may severely limit the impact of any 
judgment by the ICC and restrict the international community from 
following through on punishments. 123 Second, ICC judgments may 
not carry much weight in countries that feel far removed from the 
prosecution process, and may result in empty punishments and hol-
                                                                                                                      
119 See Lipscomb, supra note 4, at 204. By late fall 2005, the court had heard only six 
cases––most of them prosecutions of men who refused to take part in the genocide. Am-
nesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 24; Rubin, supra note 27. The chairman of the court has 
called allegations of mass rape a “Western fabrication.” Human Rights Watch, En-
trenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Dar-
fur 60 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/darfur1205text.pdf 
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Entrenching Impunity]. Furthermore, many Su-
danese citizens are unaware of the court’s existence. Rubin, supra note 27. 
120 See Hewett, supra note 36, at 279. Hewett quotes the former head of the U.N. 
Commission of Inquiry as asserting that the trials have “no credibility” and calling the en-
tire Sudanese judiciary “flawed.” Id. Hewett also notes that human rights groups have ex-
pressed skepticism of Sudan’s motives. Id.; see Human Rights Watch, Entrenching Im-
punity, supra note 119, at 1, 52 (describing the Sudanese court as having no accountability 
or intention to prosecute defendants); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? 
Darfur in the International Criminal Court, 13 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1, 31 (2005) (calling 
the Sudanese court a “Kangaroo court”). 
121 See Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Presents Evidence, supra note 108. The prosecu-
tor states that the ICC has devoted considerable resources to assessing admissibility on the 
jurisdiction issue, and is confident that the indictments do not violate the complementarity 
rule. Wagner, supra note 4, at 221; Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Presents Evidence, supra 
note 108. This was confirmed by the ICC in its ruling on the merits of the case. Harun & 
Al Abd-Ak-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application 
Under Article 58(7) of the Statute, supra note 109, ¶¶ 11–17. 
122 See J. Peter Pham, A Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The Special Court for Si-
erra Leone, 19 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 37, 40 (2006). From these three specific limitations arise 
arguments that international criminal prosecutions can sometimes do more harm than good. 
See Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment 
at the International Criminal Court, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 801, 818–19 (2006). 
123 See Van Dyke, supra note 83, at 172–73. Some believe that the United States’ refusal 
to support the Rome Statute has weakened the credibility of the ICC and could make con-
victions difficult to enforce. See Phelps, supra note 46, at 518–19. Others contend that the 
United States’ opposition to the ICC is a losing battle and that the United States will even-
tually have to become a party to the court. Stephens, supra note 98, at 529–30. 
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low justice.124 Third, even with the progress brought by the February 
indictments, it will take several more years for justice truly to be done, 
as the process of obtaining enough evidence to prosecute war crimi-
nals is extremely lengthy.125 
4. Why the ICC Is Necessary 
 Despite these limitations, criminal trials are an essential compo-
nent of the quest for justice for Darfur and, as discussed above, the 
ICC is the most effective channel available for such trials.126 Trials, 
even if they take years, not only hold perpetrators accountable, but 
                                                                                                                      
124 See Blumenson, supra note 122, at 854; Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 
267. Blumenson argues that those with the greatest stake in ICC decisions—the victims— 
have no power to influence the process or hold the ICC accountable for prosecution fail-
ures. Blumenson, supra note 122, at 854. Others argue that because the ICC prosecutions 
are based in the Hague, they are detached from the political and cultural realities of the 
victims and may not be effective at promoting reconciliation. Lipscomb, supra note 4, at 
193–94. Lipscomb also cautions that the ICC will be less effective if it operates under a 
traditional Western punitive justice framework focused on retribution and deterrence 
rather than under a healing framework more reflective of the cultures of the victims. Id. at 
194–95. 
125 See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 165; Wagner, supra note 4, at 220 (arguing that Su-
dan’s lack of cooperation could seriously impede attempts at holding the perpetrators 
accountable for their actions in Darfur); Rubin, supra note 27 (noting that the ICC prose-
cutor has admitted that his investigation will take years); ICC: How the Court Works, supra 
note 102 (describing the ICC’s lengthy evidentiary and pre-trial processes). Commentators 
suggest that the international legal proceedings for Darfur have been exceptionally slow 
due to a Western bias against Africa and a lack of media attention on the genocide due to 
this bias. See Sackellares, supra note 6, at 160–61. The investigation into Darfur is not yet 
complete more than two years after it began, as the prosecutor has acknowledged that 
there remain a number of outstanding requests for documents. Press Release, ICC Prose-
cutor Ready With Evidence, supra note 111. 
126 Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 23, ¶ 573; see Pham, supra note 122, at 
41–42; Wagner, supra note 4, at 240. Some have advocated the use of a hybrid national and 
international tribunal rather than a strictly international forum like the ICC. Lipscomb, 
supra note 4, at 186. Lipscomb argues that a hybrid tribunal involving the Sudanese legal 
community overseen by the ICC would be more effective because it would also strengthen 
the Sudanese judicial system. Id. Others, however, have noted problems with hybrid tribu-
nals. See Udombana, Pay Back Time, supra note 120, at 10. A hybrid tribunal currently exists 
in Sierra Leone, but it has been hampered by credibility and financial problems, largely 
because of lukewarm support and interest from the international community. Id. Fur-
thermore, others have noted that even if hybrid tribunals are effective elsewhere, one 
would be impractical in Sudan because the judicial system is completely controlled by the 
same government officials who are responsible for the genocide. See Delmas-Marty, supra 
note 97, at 6. Given the fact that the current peace agreements in force in Sudan promise 
continued power to President al-Bashir, regime change, and thus changes in the judicial 
system, is extremely unlikely. See Lipscomb, supra note 4, at 186. 
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also provide victims with a voice they otherwise would not have had.127 
Trials are important to the legal community as a whole because the 
establishment of a permanent record condemning atrocities creates a 
vivid reminder of genocide’s destruction.128 This can serve as a power-
ful legal precedent for punishing future acts of rape as a weapon of 
war, create more international acceptance of protections for women 
in armed conflict, and reduce cultural stigmas against rape victims.129 
Prosecutions may help prevent future genocides by sending a signal to 
governments around the world that the international community will 
hold perpetrators of sexual violence accountable.130 Furthermore, in 
the case of Sudan, where the genocide continues and increasingly 
threatens international peace and security, prosecution is one of the 
only tools that can bring a permanent end to the violence.131 But de-
spite these benefits, prosecution cannot be the only response, as the 
victims of these atrocities deserve much more complete and immedi-
ate justice.132 
III. Alternative Forms of Justice 
This is ethnic cleansing, this is the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis, 
and I don’t know why the world isn’t doing more about it. 
—Mukesh Kapila, former U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in 
Sudan133 
 Justice is more than simply prosecution.134 Justice is also restorative 
and humanitarian, and does not necessarily come from within the 
                                                                                                                      
127 O’Connell, supra note 68, at 310, 319–20. O’Connell argues that trials can signal 
society’s new solidarity with victims and acknowledgment of victims’ dignity, which may 
alleviate some victims’ loneliness and suffering. Id. 
128 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 241; Meier, supra note 10, at 133. 
129 Wagner, supra note 4, at 241, 242. Vigorous prosecution can delegitimize the cul-
tural stigma attached to rape, educate the public about the true plight of rape victims, and 
shape public opinion about the unacceptability of rape. Udombana, Pay Back Time, supra 
note 120, at 22; Wagner, supra note 4, at 241, 242. 
130 Rubin, supra note 27. 
131 Angelina Jolie, Op-Ed., Justice for Darfur, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 2007, at A19; see 
Wagner, supra note 4, at 194, 241, 242. 
132 See, e.g., Pham, supra note 122, at 41; Jolie, supra note 131; Kristof, The Face of Geno-
cide, supra note 2. 
133 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 3. 
134 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 220, 269; see also Drumbl, supra note 
95, at 65 (arguing that legal justice must be externalized); Wagner, supra note 4, at 240 
(stating that no international court will be able to undo the great damage that sexual vio-
lence has brought on Darfur). 
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law.135 The standard human rights response to past genocides has been 
to investigate and prosecute those responsible; although this long and 
complicated process benefits the international community, it ignores 
the more immediate needs of the victims.136 Survivors of genocide, and 
rape victims in particular, need more than just legal vindication.137 Dur-
ing and after the conflict, they need food and medical treatment for 
themselves and their families, financial assistance to rebuild their local 
economies, and protection against future attacks.138 These short-term 
needs cannot be met by the legal system.139 Thus, in formulating a re-
sponse to the Darfur genocide, the international community must rec-
ognize the realities of the victims and make justice resonate on the 
ground.140 This is a complementary process; one form of justice cannot 
supersede or replace the other.141 Rather, this approach adds focus to 
the victims’ physical and social needs during the wait for the legal 
process to bring its form of justice.142 
A. Where Do We Go from Here? 
1. Humanitarian Assistance 
 It is difficult to conceptualize what it would take to make the 
women of Darfur whole again.143 But it is clear that the international 
community, including the U.N., the United States, other governments, 
and non-governmental organizations, must take steps to meet the 
women of Darfur’s immediate physical and economic needs with tar-
geted humanitarian aid.144 This cannot wait until after the genocide has 
                                                                                                                      
135 Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 220, 269. Cahn argues that legal re-
sponses are often inadequate because they only address limited aspects of the victims’ post-
conflict needs and not practical aspects of victims’ lives. Id. at 221. As a result, the ICC is 
not the complete answer to genocide. Id. at 267; see also Chanté Lasco, Repairing the Irrepa-
rable: Current and Future Approaches to Reparations, Hum. Rts. Brief, Winter 2003, at 18, 18 
(2003). 
136 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 218; see also Drumbl, supra note 95, at 42. 
137 Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 220–21. 
138 Id. at 221, 242, 247; see Udombana, Pay Back Time, supra note 120, at 47. 
139 Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 221. 
140 See id. at 219. This means shaping the administration of aid in ways that address cus-
toms within Sudanese society, including the social and familial roles occupied by women. Id. 
141 See id. at 245. 
142 Lipscomb, supra note 4, at 195. Some believe that focusing on the long-term eco-
nomic and social needs of the victims may be more valuable than criminal prosecutions in 
the prevention of future genocides. Id. 
143 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 247; Lasco, supra note 135, at 1. 
144 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 247; Lasco, supra note 135, at 18. The 
current humanitarian response has been weakened by the failure of many nations to fulfill 
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ended or the violence has ceased; it must happen now.145 There are no 
legal barriers, no complementarity tests, to ending despair in this 
way.146 The Sudanese government, which continues to deny the exis-
tence of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, is unable or unwilling to ful-
fill its human rights obligations to its own citizens, and has allowed the 
country to become a wilderness of atrocity and crime.147 Sudan is ut-
terly incapable of providing even the most basic services and protec-
tions to its own citizens, including physical security, health care, educa-
tion, transportation, or economic infrastructure.148 The international 
community must step in where Sudan has failed.149 
 The international community must immediately devise a plan for 
distributing both basic short-term and more comprehensive long-term 
humanitarian aid in Darfur.150 Initial distribution of food and clean 
water must be accompanied by an immediate deployment of skilled 
physicians to provide comprehensive, gender-sensitive medical care.151 
In order to save their lives, the women of Darfur, particularly rape vic-
tims, desperately need obstetric and gynecological care, HIV/AIDS test-
ing, and psychological counseling.152 Next, the international commu-
nity must make improvements in the living conditions in the refugee 
camps in Chad and the IDP camps in Sudan, as these will be home to 
hundreds of thousands of Darfurians for the foreseeable future. 153 
These camps can be made safer for women through increased numbers 
of female aid workers, the addition of trained medical professionals, 
                                                                                                                      
promised commitments. See Jafari, supra note 22, at 21. Likewise, the U.N. has been nota-
bly slow and ineffective in providing humanitarian aid in Darfur. See Deans, supra note 13, 
at 1654; see also Islam, supra note 32, at 357 (stating that the U.N. response “has been more 
than whispering but less than roaring”); Nicholas D. Kristof, Dithering Through Death, N.Y. 
Times, May 16, 2006, at A25 (stating that the U.N. has “barely put a speed bump in the 
path to genocide in Darfur”). 
145 Sackellares, supra note 6, at 155–56. 
146 See Islam, supra note 32, at 370. 
147 Id.; see Udombana, Pay Back Time, supra note 120, at 5; Wagner, supra note 4, at 200. 
148 Udombana, Pay Back Time, supra note 120, at 5. 
149 See id. 
150 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 5; Lasco, supra note 135, at 20. 
151 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 5; Avery, supra note 32, at 
134–35. 
152 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 34–35; Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, 
at 247–48, 258; see also Drumbl, supra note 95, at 70 (noting that rape victims require spe-
cialized medical and psychological treatment). Providers should ensure that medical and 
psychological treatment is compatible with the religious and cultural traditions of Darfur. 
Gingerich & Leaning, supra note 19, at 2. 
153 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 4, at 34–35. These camps are overcrowded and lack 
food, water, and basic supplies. Jafari, supra note 22, at 21. In 2004, new arrivals had to wait 
up to a month just for a tent. Id. 
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development of economic and education opportunities for women, 
and the implementation of systems for reporting crimes and catching 
perpetrators.154 
 Beyond these immediate life-sustaining measures, the interna-
tional community should address the long-term economic and social 
needs of the Darfurian people through programs that provide access to 
land, credit, and other financial resources.155 The community and so-
cial structures of Darfur have been depleted, and the survivors of the 
genocide will require help in reclaiming their homes, rebuilding their 
communities, and forging sustainable livelihoods.156 Currently, women 
whose husbands have been killed or are missing are under tremendous 
pressure to provide for their families, and often place themselves at risk 
of rape to do so.157 Thus, long-term reconstruction assistance is impera-
tive to keep the women of Darfur from being re-exposed to violence.158 
 Complicating these efforts, however, is the fact that the security 
situation in Darfur is incredibly unstable. 159 Since the failed peace 
agreement among the government and the rebel groups in May 2006, 
violence in the region has spiked considerably and humanitarian op-
erations have begun to suffer as a result.160 At least twelve aid workers 
have been killed, and many more have been attacked, in Darfur since 
May 2006.161 Workers have increasingly found themselves targeted for 
attack and theft by the Janjaweed, the Sudanese police, and, recently, 
multiple rebel groups.162 The U.N. and United States must take the 
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lead in providing protection for humanitarian workers, through mili-
tary or other forces, so that the victims in Darfur can receive the assis-
tance they so desperately need.163 
2. Reparations 
 In addition to tangible humanitarian assistance, the international 
community must attempt to make victims of genocide whole through 
financial reparations. 164 Reparations promote a sense of justice and 
contribute to the process of reconciliation by helping victims rebuild 
their identities.165 Even though reparations have not traditionally been 
part of international criminal justice, victims’ right to reparations is a 
well-founded concept in international law.166 The ICC is unique in its 
power to make reparations orders directly against perpetrators as part 
of its punishment. 167 Through the ICC’s Victims’ Trust Fund, the ICC 
can award reparations to victims against their perpetrators’ property or 
from the fund itself.168 
 Direct reparations, though complicated and time-consuming, are 
possible.169 In the 1990s, a U.N. Compensation Committee provided 
restitution to hundreds of thousands of corporations and individuals 
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who suffered losses during Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 
the early part of the decade.170 Additionally, in the twelve years since 
the end of its destructive ethnic conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
successfully managed to return more than 200,000 homes to people 
displaced during the conflict.171 This effort has become a leading model 
for the emerging post-conflict right of restitution, which argues that 
compensating victims is a durable solution that helps redress the crimes 
and restore the rule of law. 172 The institution of a similar program to 
provide the return of property and direct financial compensation to 
the women of Darfur could help rectify the loss of their homes, liveli-
hood, and families.173 Whether paid for by the perpetrators, the Suda-
nese government, the international community, or some combination 
thereof, these reparations would not only serve as an unmistakable 
apology, it would also provide the women with a tangible way to rebuild 
their lives.174 
3. Military Protection 
 In addition to humanitarian and financial assistance, the interna-
tional community needs to expand and improve current military tactics 
aimed at ending the genocide.175 To put a true end to the violence in 
Darfur and to ensure the protection of women, the international 
community, led by the U.N. and the United States, must immediately 
send a massive peacekeeping force to the region.176 Right now, there is 
                                                                                                                      
170 John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing of Rights 
Between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 
141, 141 (2005). 
171 Rhodri C. Williams, Post-Conflict Property Restitution and Refugee Return in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Implications for International Standard-Setting and Practice, 37 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 441, 442–43 (2005). This legal process has succeeded despite fierce initial political 
resistance to refugee return. Id. at 444. 
172 See id. at 448. 
173 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 3–4; Lasco, supra note 135, at 
20; Kristof, How Do You Solve a Crisis Like Darfur?, supra note 28. 
174 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 3–4; Lasco, supra note 135, at 
20; Kristof, How Do You Solve a Crisis Like Darfur?, supra note 28. The ideal solution would 
be for the Sudanese government to pay the full amount of reparations using profits from 
the sale of oil and other commodities, but such an order would be difficult to enforce. See 
Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 24, at 4. 
175 See Kristof, Disposable Cameras for Disposable People, supra note 1; Kristof, If Not Now, 
When?, supra note 17; Joseph Loconte, The U.N.’s Masquerade, Nat’l Review Online, Sept. 
26, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/ (use search term “masquerade” for 9/26/2006). 
176 Deans, supra note 13, at 1685–86; Kagan, supra note 36, at 462. With proper inter-
national support and adequate financial and logistical resources, which the U.N. is capable 
of providing, a large peacekeeping mission can be successful. See Gingerich & Leaning, 
 
232 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:203 
no force in Darfur capable of protecting civilians or preventing further 
violence. 177  Nearly 7000 African Union (AU) troops are stationed 
throughout the country, but the force is poorly equipped, underfi-
nanced, and, per an agreement with the Sudanese government that 
gives them no mandate to intervene against violence, nearly power-
less.178 In response to pleas for additional help, in August 2007 the U.N. 
announced a plan to send nearly 26,000 additional peacekeepers to 
Darfur beginning in late 2007.179 The Sudanese government, having 
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previously rejected plans for additional peacekeepers, has agreed to 
accept this peacekeeping force.180 
 While a significant step, the U.N. plan is not sufficient.181 It does 
not move peacekeepers into the region quickly enough and, in giving 
the soldiers only a defensive role, does not provide the necessary pro-
tection for the women of Darfur. 182 Therefore, in addition to this 
minimal peacekeeping force, the U.N. must also explore the use of 
other military options with or without Sudan’s consent, such as the 
deployment of proactive NATO troops into the region, the establish-
ment of a strict no-fly zone over Darfur, and blockades of Sudanese 
ports.183 This idea is a controversial one, as the U.N. and the United 
States are terrified of establishing a military presence in yet another 
Muslim country, but with the violence in Darfur only getting worse, it 
is time to put the lives of the Darfurian people ahead of geopolitical 
concerns. 184  Despite optimistic statements by international leaders, 
the threat of rape and violence in Darfur is not going away.185 Rather 
than abandon Darfur because of the politics involved, the interna-
tional community must take drastic steps, even those previously con-
sidered unthinkable, because of the humanity involved.186 
 In addition to an immediate military force capable of protecting 
the people of Darfur, the international community must also make 
long-range plans to maintain peace in the region.187 This must include 
monitoring peace talks between Darfurian rebel groups, who are oper-
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ating under an uneasy peace, and the Sudanese government.188 Long-
term peace will also require increased intelligence surveillance of the 
region, a careful watch of the Sudanese government’s importation of 
weapons, and contingency plans for more forceful military intervention 
if the violence does not cease or if the Sudanese government becomes 
even more uncooperative.189 
4. Diplomatic Tactics 
 Beyond peacekeeping and military operations, which are an ad-
mittedly unpopular step, there are several political tactics that the 
United States and the U.N. should take to pressure the Sudanese gov-
ernment to end the genocide.190 The United States has slowly begun to 
implement pressure tactics; in 2006, Congress enacted legislation call-
ing for sanctions on Sudan, and in 2007, President Bush announced 
several small economic repercussions for the country.191 However, there 
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are many more tangible steps that can and should be taken immedi-
ately in order to give the Sudanese government a clear message that its 
genocidal actions will no longer be tolerated.192 
 To send this message, stricter economic sanctions on the Sudanese 
government are necessary.193 The plan announced by President Bush 
will not convince President al-Bashir to end his relentless violence; 
rather, buoyed by wealth from oil exports, he will continue to blithely 
ignore weak international pressure.194 Instead, the international com-
munity must come up with a unique and comprehensive sanctions 
plan, one that includes broad economic measures such as blocking 
ships that transport Sudanese oil from international ports, freezing the 
bank accounts of Sudanese government officials, and prohibiting in-
ternational banks from conducting oil-related transactions that benefit 
the Sudanese government.195 This plan must be accompanied by heavy 
political pressure on China, Sudan’s closest ally, to convince the Suda-
nese government to end the violence in Darfur.196 As Sudan’s major 
weapons supplier and the largest buyer of Sudanese oil, China has in-
credible leverage over the Sudanese government.197 The United States 
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and the U.N. must use their combined political leverage to force China 
to intervene.198 
 The obligation to stop genocide extends beyond governments.199 
Individual citizens and businesses must take responsibility for ending 
the violence in Darfur.200 Divestment by corporations, financial insti-
tutions, universities, and individuals from all financial ties with Sudan 
is a small but powerful step that will show the Sudanese government 
that the entire world condemns its actions in Darfur.201 Some progress 
in divestment efforts has already been made; persistent lobbying by 
the Save Darfur Coalition, a non-profit organization that advocates for 
intervention in Darfur, forced two major investors to divest holdings 
in a large Chinese petroleum company involved in Sudan’s oil indus-
try.202 Eight states and dozens of colleges and universities have begun 
selling their Sudanese-related investments. 203 If widespread, contin-
ued divestment of Sudanese- and Chinese-related investments could 
be a powerful addition to the fight against genocide in Darfur.204 
Conclusion 
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in 
an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of des-
tiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. 
—Martin Luther King, Jr.205 
 As the genocide in Darfur rages and expands, the rest of the 
world continues to fail to condemn and intervene.206 Beyond the ICC, 
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the international community’s response has been feeble, painfully 
slowed by political and economic concerns, resistance by the Suda-
nese government, and, sadly, a simple apathy on the part of many 
countries and individuals toward the plight of an invisible people.207 
Four years of hesitancy and resistance has allowed the genocide in 
Darfur to spiral essentially to a point of no return, to a point where 
women like Halima Abdelkarim are being attacked over and over 
again, with no help in sight.208 
 The lack of response is not for lack of knowledge, because the 
genocide in Darfur has certainly not occurred in a vacuum.209 There 
have been numerous––although still not nearly enough––news re-
ports chronicling the destruction of Darfur over the past four years, 
nearly all containing desperate cries for help directly from Darfurian 
women. 210  Major human rights groups, including Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International, have produced painstaking docu-
mentation about the atrocities in the country.211 Despite the ready 
availability of bone-chilling stories and statistics, most countries have 
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distanced themselves from Darfur or paid it only brief lip service.212 
This is unacceptable, as countering genocide is a shared global re-
sponsibility.213 
 As the alleged leader of the free world, the United States is respon-
sible for defending universal rights and leading the response when 
these rights are violated.214 Other countries must become involved too, 
whether inspired by their moral duty to stop genocide––which includes 
confronting its aftermath and helping to ensure that conflict does not 
recur––or by their own economic and political self-interest in promot-
ing regional security in Africa.215 An overwhelming, though belated, 
international response must now begin, both to send a message to the 
perpetrators that they can no longer act with impunity and also to reas-
sure the victims, who have been betrayed not only by their attackers but 
also by those who did not step in to stop the violence.216 
 By combining long-term legal justice with concrete responses to 
Darfurian women’s immediate needs, we can punish the perpetrators 
of this horrific genocide, help repair the suffering the victims have un-
dergone, and provide lessons to the world on the revulsion with which 
genocide will be treated in the future.217 This type of holistic approach, 
one that places genocide in the broader context of economic disparity, 
poverty, global political instability, intolerance, and violence, is our best 
defense against both the current genocide and all future ones.218 Fail-
ure to respond to this massive human tragedy is a failure of our most 
basic human instincts.219 Continued failure to intervene will cost thou-
sands of lives, undermine advancements in international law, and pos-
sibly spell disaster for all of Africa.220 We owe Halima Abdelkarim––and 
thousands of women like her all over Darfur––an apology, in the form 
of both legal justice and all the redevelopment and protective assis-
tance we can offer. But we also owe something to her baby daughter––a 
promise that we will never forget the women of Darfur again. 
                                                                                                                      
212 See Kristof, Disposable Cameras for Disposable People, supra note 1; Kristof, Never Again, 
Again?, supra note 15. 
213 Kristof, A Tolerable Genocide, supra note 17. 
214 See Avery, supra note 32, at 137; see also Daniel Allott, Strategic Compassion in Darfur, 
Am. Spectator Online, Mar. 24, 2006, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id= 
9574 (predicting that the United States’ work in Darfur is just beginning). 
215 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 250. 
216 See Drumbl, supra note 95, at 68–69. 
217 See Cahn, Beyond Retribution, supra note 42, at 222. 
218 See Islam, supra note 32, at 384. 
219 See id. at 385. 
220 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 47; Kristof, If Not Now, When?, supra note 17. 
